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Summa Theologica: 6th ARTICLE

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 6]

Whether Man Wills All, Whatsoever He Wills, for the Last End?

Objection 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he
wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said
to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to
serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to
the last end.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his
Metaphysics (i. 2) that speculative science is sought for its own sake.
Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end.
Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last
end.

Obj. 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of
that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that
he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for
the last end.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): “That is the
end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas
we love it for its own sake.”

_I answer that,_ Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he
desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First,
because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good.
And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end,
he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good,
because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its
completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of
art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete
perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly, because
the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as
the first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary
moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first
mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the
appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite,
which is the last end.

Reply Obj. 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external
end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford
him pleasure or relaxation. But man’s consummate good is his last end.

Reply Obj. 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is
desired as the scientist’s good, included in complete and perfect
good, which is the ultimate end.

Reply Obj. 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end,
whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first
intention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every
desire directed to any object whatever, even though one’s thoughts be
not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the
road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step.
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Summa Theologica: 2ND - 5TH ARTICLES

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Proper to the Rational Nature to Act for an End?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature
to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end,
never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many
things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they are
altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because
they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as irrational
animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for
an end.

Obj. 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an
end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to
things that lack reason.

Obj. 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But
"the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to act for
an end belongs to none but a rational nature.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not
only mind but also nature acts for an end."

_I answer that,_ Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if,
in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed,
the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all
causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does
not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for
nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does
not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were
not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing
rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a
determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some
certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this
determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational
appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is
caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural
appetite."

Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its
action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to
the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as
an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer
who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are
possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have
dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the
"faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend
to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not
by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such,
and consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be
ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature
is in comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent, as
stated above (I, Q. 22, A. 2, ad 4; Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3). Consequently
it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing
(_agens_) and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper to the
irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another,
whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do not
apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether
void of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the
end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when
he acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's
compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it
is thus with irrational creatures.

Reply Obj. 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs
itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that
which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an
irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.
Reply Obj. 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in
universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that
lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal;
but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate
to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are
moved by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends
the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular
departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason
are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational
will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 3]

Whether Human Acts Are Specified by Their End?

Objection 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their
end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified
by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by
their end.

Obj. 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist
before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a
human act does not derive its species from the end.

Obj. 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But
one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends.
Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13):
"According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds
worthy of blame or praise."

_I answer that,_ Each thing receives its species in respect of an act
and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of
matter and form are established in their respective species by their
own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For
since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each
of these receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act
which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is
the terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is
nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while
heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat:
and it is the definition that shows the specific nature. And either
way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as
passions, receive their species from the end. For human acts can be
considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by
himself. Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that acts are called
human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the
object of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear
that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the
end. In like manner it is their terminus: for the human act
terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural
agents the form of the thing generated is conformed to the form of
the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.)
"morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking
receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as
human acts.

Reply Obj. 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because
it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just
this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something,
considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as
passion.

Reply Obj. 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention,
pertains to the will, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). And it is thus
that it gives the species to the human or moral act.

Reply Obj. 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds
once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which
it has its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of
which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an
act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to
several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill a man," which is but
one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as to an
end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger:
the result being that there would be several acts in different species
of morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in
another, an act of vice. For a movement does not receive its species
from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which
is its _per se_ terminus. Now moral ends are accidental to a natural
thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to
morality. Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same
considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered
in their moral species, and conversely.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 4]

Whether There Is One Last End of Human Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life,
but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds
from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other
good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has
the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends.

Obj. 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to
infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same
reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number,
the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is
consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that
there is also an infinite series of ends.

Obj. 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But
the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can
will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely.
Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and
there is no last end of the human will.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to
suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the
good is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary
to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is
necessary to fix one last end.

_I answer that,_ Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed
indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in
whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if
the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of
necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.
viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement,
because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can
the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first
mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends--the order
of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders
there must be something first. For that which is first in the order of
intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite;
consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to
move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is
that wherein operation has its beginning; and if this principle be
taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the
intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is the
first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, on
neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no
last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its
term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there
is no first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would
begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would
continue indefinitely.

On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that
are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for
accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that
there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the
end.

Reply Obj. 1: The very nature of good is that something flows from
it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good
has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this
argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that from the
end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards
those things that are ordained to the end. And this would be true if
we considered but the power of the First Good, which is infinite.
But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect,
to which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a
certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the
flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods
share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods
does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wis. 11:21), God
disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."

Reply Obj. 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins from
principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term.
Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no
infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process
of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one
another. But in those things which are accidentally connected,
nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is
accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or
unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders
the reason from an indefinite process.

Reply Obj. 3: This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on
itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the
fact that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on
itself indifferently once or several times.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 5]

Whether One Man Can Have Several Last Ends?

Objection 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed
at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four
things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue."
But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place
the last end of his will in many things.

Obj. 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not
exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in
opposition to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing
is the last end of the will does not exclude others.

Obj. 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one
thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its
last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something
else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in
pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches.
Therefore it is possible for one man's will to be directed at the
same time to several things, as last ends.

_On the contrary,_ That in which a man rests as in his last end, is
master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of
life. Hence of gluttons it is written (Phil. 3:19): "Whose god is
their belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures
of the belly. Now according to Matt. 6:24, "No man can serve two
masters," such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore
it is impossible for one man to have several last ends not ordained
to one another.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible for one man's will to be directed
at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may
be assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its
own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he
desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ.
Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it
passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be
complete." It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill
man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire.
Which is not possible, if something else be required for his
perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to
tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.

The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning,
the principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of
the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that
which is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature
tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the
rational appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will
tends, as to its last end, is one.

The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their
species from the end, as stated above (A. 3), they must needs receive
their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as
natural things are placed in a genus according to a common form.
Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as
such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more
because in every genus there is one first principle; and the last end
has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last
end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last
end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of
all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual
man must be fixed on one last end.

Reply Obj. 1: All these several objects were considered as one
perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the
last end.

Reply Obj. 2: Although it is possible to find several things which
are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's
perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's
perfection.

Reply Obj. 3: The power of the will does not extend to making
opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to
tend to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above
(ad 2).
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Summa Theologica: FIRST ARTICLE

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 1]

Whether It Belongs to Man to Act for an End?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for
an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name,
implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But
that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this
preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it
does not belong to man to act for an end.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end.
But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.

Obj. 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts
deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation,
sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when
one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent
on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.

_On the contrary,_ All things contained in a genus are derived from
the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human
operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it
belongs to man to do everything for an end.

_I answer that,_ Of actions done by man those alone are properly
called "human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from
irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions.
Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man
is master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and
will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty and will
of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human which
proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in
man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly "human"
actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear
that whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power
in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the
will is the end and the good. Therefore all human actions must be for
an end.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet
it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this way
that it is a cause.

Reply Obj. 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be
voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action
is voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by
the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited
by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is
impossible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end.
For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is
color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of
seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object;
so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of
willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action be the last
end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some
action of man, at least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore
whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even
when he does that action in which the last end consists.

Reply Obj. 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions; since
they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the
proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an
imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.
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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) by Saint Thomas Aquinas - Project Gutenberg

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